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neoliberal programmes. For instance, the journals Capitalism, Nature, Socialism and Geoforum have both 
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Marxist or neo-Marxist in its explanatory and evaluative approach. Although theoretically informed, it is 
also insistently empirical: it attempts to trace the environmental logics and effects of neoliberalism 
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normative termsöfor the empirical trees. In the absence of a systematic review of the empirical literature I 
suspect that we will remain unclear what gains are being made in terms of concepts, evidence, or critique. 
Keywords 
necessary, illusions, confusions, neoliberalism, consolations, neoliberalisation 
Disciplines 
Education | Social and Behavioral Sciences 
Publication Details 
Castree, N. (2006). From neoliberalism to neoliberalisation: consolations, confusions, and necessary 
illusions. Environment and Planning A: international journal of urban and regional research, 38 (1), 1-6. 
This journal article is available at Research Online: https://ro.uow.edu.au/sspapers/1081 
From neoliberalism to neoliberalization: consolations, confusions and necessary 
illusions 
 
Of late, I’ve been conducting a review of empirical research that analyses the 
relationships between neoliberalism and the non-human world. When published, the 
review will, I hope, be a useful way-station in advancing our understanding of these 
relationships. In a short space of time there’s been a proliferation of research into the 
‘nature of neoliberalism and the neoliberalization of nature’ (McCarthy and Prudham, 
2004). Until recently neoliberalism had been the topical preserve of critically-minded 
urban, economic and development geographers. Now, though, a cohort of 
environmental geographers – also critically-minded – have turned their attention to 
how the non-human world affects and is affected by neoliberal programmes. For 
instance, the journals Capitalism, Nature, Socialism and Geoforum have both devoted 
whole issues to the topic in the last 12 months. Much of the research I’m surveying is 
Marxist or neo-Marxist in its explanatory and evaluative approach. While 
theoretically informed, it is also insistently empirical: it attempts to trace the 
environmental logics and effects of neoliberalism contextually. My aim has been to 
parse it so that we can see the proverbial woods – in diagnostic and normative terms – 
for the empirical trees. In the absence of a systematic review of the empirical 
literature I suspect that we’ll remain unclear what gains are being made in terms of 
concepts, evidence or critique.  
Yet in the slow (but enjoyable) process of reviewing the literature I’ve become 
increasingly confused as to the precise object of analytical attention. It’s not simply 
that the research papers I’m reading focus on different kinds of natural and altered 
environments (hardly surprising given the world’s biophysical diversity). In addition, 
the political economic project driving environmental change – ‘neoliberalism’ – 
seems to alter its shape from paper to paper. So, while the authors whose essays and 
chapters I’m reading appear to share a common analytical focus – their different 
environmental expertises notwithstanding – it turns out that this focus is rather fuzzy. 
This is not just an empirical issue. In theoretical terms what counts as neoliberalism 
does not appear to be a matter of consensus among critics in geography and cognate 
fields. In some cases privatisation and marketization are the key criteria; in other 
cases additional features are listed among its differentia specifica. Empirically, it’s no 
surprise to discover that, however defined, ‘neoliberalism’ does not ‘ground itself’ 
unchanged from place to place. Rather, as the case studies I’ve been reading show so 
well, its embedding in real world situations muddies the clean lines of its conceptual 
specification. 
 So far so unexceptional. Anyone with an even passing familiarity with 
geographical debates over previous grand abstractions – like post-modernity, post-
Fordism or globalization – will doubtless interpret my ‘fuzzy concept’ problem as no 
problem at all. Given time, it might be thought that those researchers whose empirical 
work I am surveying will sharpen theoretical understandings of neoliberalism by 
carefully specifying different modalities of ‘actually existing neoliberalism’. This 
being early days, it might be thought that we still have some way to go before 
research into the ‘nature’ of neoliberalism reaches maturity. ‘Maturity’, from this 
perspective, would be a situation where a substantial body of evidence has both arisen 
from and altered increasingly refined conceptualisations of what neoliberalism is all 
about. Since this involves increased theoretical complexity, then the theoretical 
abstraction ‘neoliberalism’ will, over time, give way to plural understandings of 
neoliberalisation as a really existing process rather than an ageographical thing. The 
end result will be that environmental geographers – like other geographers interested 
in neoliberalism – will move from the heavens of abstract theory to the nitty-gritty of 
empirical specifics ending-up somewhere in-between: with mid-range 
conceptualisations that have genuine explanatory and normative purchase.  
Though the above scenario is not implausible, I have nagging doubts – ones 
whose implications extend way beyond my immediate subject of concern. My worry 
is that analysts of neoliberalism’s environmental impacts are travelling down a road to 
nowhere. The potential dead-end to which I refer is not a function of the topic being 
researched – like any political economic project, neoliberalism will have non-trivial 
effects on the non-human world (and therefore on us). It is essential that these effects 
be described, explained and evaluated. But the key question – and the basis of my 
concern – is what precisely produces these effects. Ostensibly it is ‘neoliberalism’ of 
course. But since geographical researchers of neoliberalism are rightly trying to 
complicate and dehomogenise this thought-abstraction, the issue of what, precisely, 
the object of analysis is arises. If, as Barnett (2005: 9) states, ‘There is no such thing 
as neoliberalism!’, then we are forced to recognise one of two possibilities. The first – 
apropos the mid-level theory mentioned above – is that there are distinct kinds of 
neoliberalisation whose environmental impacts can be fairly accurately understood 
(even though there’s unlikely to be a consistent relationship between kinds and 
impacts). The second is that even at this meso-level neoliberalism can only exist as a 
thought-abstraction not a ‘real entity’ because ‘it’ only ever exists in articulation with 
actors, institutions and agendas that immediately call into question whether a thing 
called ‘neoliberalism’ – however carefully specified – can be held responsible for 
anything. 
 Clearly, I am touching here upon fundamental research issues – those of 
ontology and epistemology – that cannot be resolved at a purely philosophical level. 
To date, researchers of neoliberalism in urban and economic geography have tended 
to resist the second possibility mentioned above (perhaps because it appears to lead to 
the dead-end of an idiographic focus on the unique and the singular). Instead, they 
believe that ongoing empirical research can be synthesised and compared so that mid-
level concepts will emerge. The likelihood is that the environmental geographers 
whose research I’ve recently been reading will, similarly, see the production of such 
grounded concepts as their long term objective. If so, I wish to give them pause for 
thought – so too all those other geographers undertaking theoretically informed and 
theoretically relevant empirical research into neoliberalism’s actually existing forms.  
 A brief exploration of some unresolved tensions in the writings of Wendy 
Larner and Jamie Peck is instructive here. Economic geographers both, Larner and 
Peck’s overview pieces on neoliberalism have enjoyed a wide readership among 
critical geographers (Larner, 2003; Peck 2001, 2004; see also Peck and Tickell, 2002). 
Both authors have tried to set agendas for current and future geographical research 
into neoliberalism that touch upon the source of my concern in this commentary. 
Larner (2003: 510) has argued that neoliberalism needs to be given “an identity crisis”. 
Following Gibson-Graham (1996) she argues that when critical scholars reify 
neoliberalism as a hegemonic, unified entity they, perversely, exaggerate its power 
despite their oppositional stance towards it. Her recommendation is that we take 
aspatial and universal conceptions of neoliberalism and render them geographical: 
that we pay attention to “the different variants of neoliberalism, to the hybrid nature 
of contemporary policies and programmes, … [and] to the multiple and contradictory 
aspects of neoliberal spaces, techniques and subjects” (ibid. 509). However, perhaps 
aware that this argument can be seen to license the proliferation of disconnected case 
studies, she also stresses “the important contributions of academic work focused on 
identifying the similarities between different forms of neoliberalism” (ibid. 510).  
 The hidden tensions in Larner’s argument become manifest in Jamie Peck’s 
excellent synoptic essays on neoliberalism. He notes that neoliberalism is a 
“perplexingly amorphous political economic phenomena” (2004: 394) because it 
remains unclear at what geographical scales and levels of theoretical abstraction we 
can identify it. As he puts it, “While the neoliberal discourses and strategies that are 
mobilized in … different settings share certain family resemblances, local institutional 
context clearly (and really) matters in the style, substance, origins and outcomes …” 
(ibid. 395). This is more than a reiteration of Larner’s apparently sensible attempt to 
give the grand abstraction ‘neoliberalism’ an identity crisis. More than Larner, Peck 
wants to identify commonalities-within-apparent-difference without succumbing to 
“the fallacies of monolithism … or convergence thinking” (ibid. 403). As he 
continues, “While geographers tend to be rightly sceptical of spatially totalizing 
claims, splitting differences over varieties of neoliberalism cannot be an end in itself, 
not least because it begs questions about the common roots and shared features of the 
unevenly neoliberalized landscape that confronts us” (ibid.). What Peck seems to have 
in mind here is not a process of pure thought abstraction: one where generic 
similarities among different neoliberalisms are identified yielding a ‘neoliberal 
model’ that nowhere exists as such. Instead, Peck recognises that all neoliberalisations 
are hybrid from the outset (“… even the United States represents a ‘case’, rather than 
the model itself” [ibid. 393]). It follows for him, therefore, that “in the absence of a 
more careful mapping of these hybrids-in-connection, the concept of neoliberalism … 
remains seriously underspecified, little more in some cases than a radical-theoretical 
slogan” (ibid. 403). 
 It seems to me that, despite his best efforts, Peck fails to satisfactorily address 
some key problems in the argument that both he and Larner are advancing. In a sense 
both authors want to have their cake and eat it. They insist that we identify different 
modalities of neoliberalism without giving up on the task of discussing “the 
abstraction we might provisionally term neoliberalism in general” (ibid. 395) – where 
the latter now arises from a comparative consideration of empirical research rather 
than a priori thought-experiments or reference to the programmatic writings of 
Friedman and Hayek. For my own part I see difficulties with this ‘both/and’ agenda 
even as I understand the intentions behind it. Let me explain. 
 First, part of neoliberalism’s ‘perplexing amorphousness’ – whatever 
geographical scale or level of theoretical abstraction we’re dealing with – stems from 
a fairly intractable inability to ‘fix’ the term’s meanings and real world referents. 
Unlike, say, water – which in one of its three states remains water wherever and 
whenever it is – neoliberalism does not possess stable characteristics. We only ‘know’ 
what a given phenomena is neoliberal – or has “a more than trivial degree of 
neoliberal content” (ibid. 403) – because we have selected from among several 
definitions that other researchers or real world actors use to specify that neoliberalism 
is. Because these definitions are multiple – as I noted earlier, critics usually offer 
between two and several criteria when defining what counts as a neoliberal idea or 
policy – then ‘the real world’ can only partly function as a ‘court of appeal’ to resolve 
competing claims as to what is (or is not) neoliberal in degree and kind. 
 Second, even if this were not an issue, neoliberal practices always, as Larner 
and Peck rightly argue, exist in a more-than-neoliberal context. The context matters 
because it introduces difference, path dependency and unevenness in terms of process 
and outcome: neoliberalizations in the plural. But this then begs the question: what 
does it mean to abstract from context (again, whatever geographical scale or level of 
theoretical abstraction we’re dealing with) in the way that Larner and especially Peck 
recommend? Even in Peck’s subtle reading of ‘neoliberalism in general’ we confront 
the possibility that we’re simply listing generic – albeit historically specific – 
characteristics found in multiple geographical contexts. Since the effects of these 
characteristics can only ever be understood contextually then the suspicion arises that 
neoliberalism depicted over and above context is a pure archetype: something unreal 
that has no consequences or existence in itself.  
 This, of course, raises the key question of where context begins and where it 
ends. Phrased differently, it raises the question of geographical scale: at what socially 
constituted scale/s does/do discrete modes of neoliberal policy and practice exist? The 
answer, as the growing empirical literature shows, is that it very much depends. One 
of the reasons that critics see neoliberalism as tendentially hegemonic is because it 
has been ‘rolled out’ by global institutions (like the World Bank) with the (apparent) 
power to impose their will on whole countries. But this does not, of course, mean that 
it is implemented uniformly over space because of pre-existing differences in the 
configurations of state, business and civil society. What’s more, national, regional and 
local level actors in various parts of the world have enacted their own neoliberal 
policies in relation to specific sets of people, places, natural resources, industries and 
so on. So even if neoliberal ideas have, these last twenty years, diffused out from 
globally powerful bodies this does nothing to alter the fact of hybridity and variety 
that Larner and Peck both discern.  
 My third point, in light of this, is that it is wrong to believe that ‘larger’ 
geographical scales (e.g. the NAFTA area) comprise a more uniform neoliberal 
landscape ‘over-laying’ more regionally and locally variable ones. The point, surely, 
is that even global policies and rules ‘bite’ differently all the way from the continental 
down to the local scales. In other words, ‘difference’ does not begin (or somehow 
‘deepen’) at the local scale alone (as implied by Perreault and Martin [2005]). Neither 
Larner nor Peck suggest that it does, but there’s nonetheless the risk that their 
arguments can be seen to imply that there’s a scale or scales where geographical 
difference ends and spatial similarity begins. As I suggested in the previous paragraph, 
neoliberalism is ‘impure’ at all geographical scales meaning that the search for 
similarities can easily become a formal rather than substantive exercise. 
 The way to avoid this last possibility is to do what critical realists in human 
geography have been doing for years. Supposing that we can agree on what 
neoliberalism’s defining characteristics are, we start by recognising that it exists in an 
overdetermined socionatural universe. We therefore acknowledge that it never acts 
alone – only in a faery-tale world where everything is privatised, marketised and 
commodified would this not hold true. Therefore, when we identify specific variants 
of neoliberalism we are not examining varieties of a really existing, homogenous 
genus. Instead, we are doing two things. First, we are seeing how a really-existing and 
quite widespread set of policy ideas are having conjoint effects at specific 
geographical scales (up to and including the global). In other words, we are 
examining contingently occurring processes and outcomes that may well have 
operated differently if the ‘neoliberal component’ had not been present. Secondly, this 
means the object of analysis in any giving research project is not a mere temporary 
‘variant’ of something more enduring and solid but rather a qualitatively distinct 
phenomena in its own right: namely, an articulation between certain neoliberal 
policies and a raft of other social and natural phenomena.  
 Rigorously pursued, a critical realist approach to neoliberalism or any other 
topic resists the ‘violence of abstraction’: that is, the habit of confusing epistemic 
discussions about a phenomena abstracted from its contexts of operation with 
ontological discussions about its actual behaviour and its material effects. As the now-
distant ‘localities debate’ showed, the best critical realist research does not doubt that 
certain phenomena cover wide spans of space and time. Instead, it insists that such 
phenomena are likely to be impure at all scales and this impurity must be respected 
not seen as a deviation from some norm or essence. How does this relate to attempts 
to compare different variants of neoliberalism? The answer is that critical realists 
would look for substantial (not formal) similarities in causal processes and contingent 
similarities in how those processes work out on the ground. In other words, 
geographical difference matters to critical realists ‘all the way down’ which is not the 
same as saying that the world is necessarily a patchwork of unlike parts. Critical 
realists, though not discussed by Peck in his recent work (though further back in time 
see Peck, 1996), would doubtless approach neoliberalism in the way he recommends. 
They would identify similarities between neoliberalizations not to suggest that the 
differences can be bracketed but to suggest, instead, that even with these differences 
substantial commonalities of process and outcome occur. Equally, though, they would 
be open to the evidence telling them a different story: one where the differences make 
such a difference that the commonalities exist only in name (conceptually) not 
actuality. In either case, it would be axiomatic that it is never ‘neoliberalism’ alone 
that causes anything, but always ‘neoliberalism-plus’ – begging the empirical 
question of at one point of ‘impurity’ it becomes impossible to use the term neoliberal 
in any meaningful analytic sense.  
 What’s the relevance of all this to the relatively new research literature 
exploring neoliberalisms and the non-human world? In a recent critical review of 
work by Larner, Peck and other geographic analysts of neoliberalism, Barnett (op. cit. 
9-10) has made the following observation. “For all its apparent critical force”, he 
argues,  
 
the vocabulary of ‘neoliberalism’ and ‘neoliberalization’ in fact provides a double 
consolation for leftist academics: it supplies us with plentiful opportunities for 
unveiling the real workings of hegemonic ideologies in a characteristic gesture of 
revelation; and. In so doing, it invites us to align our own professional roles with the 
activities of various actors ‘out there’, who are always framed as engaging in 
resistance or contestation.  
 
If Barnett is right (and I think he might be) then it’s important that the still young 
geographical research literature on neoliberalism and nature avoid the consolations to 
which he refers. In a recent special issue of this journal on neoliberalism in Latin 
America – in which several essays examine environmental impacts – Perreault and 
Martin (2005) seem drawn to these consolations despite themselves. On the one side, 
like Larner and Peck, they deny that neoliberalism tout court exists (only specific 
versions of it). Yet they also make plenary claims about ‘its’ implications for the 
environment and its governance (p. 193). What is the appeal of continuing to talk in 
terms of grand abstractions, even as they’re being called into question? One answer is 
that the ‘bad’ (i.e. aspatial) habits of social science thinking continue to affect 
geographical thinking. As Barnett implies, academic critics are made to feel important 
if the object of their animus appears to be hegemonic, global and powerful: something 
that demands urgent critical scrutiny. It’s far less glamorous and ‘sexy’ to have to 
constantly describe ones objects of analysis as multiple, complex and varied through 
time and space. As David Harvey (1985: xi) argued many years ago, spatiotemporal 
specificity appears to paralyse the generalising impulses of mainstream and radical 
social scientists (like economists and social theorists).  
 Avoiding the consolations of neoliberalism will also, necessarily, allow future 
geographical research on neoliberalizations of nature to avoid some explanatory and 
normative confusions. As I’ve argued in this commentary, more thought needs to be 
devoted to two things. The first is the objects of analysis at any given scale of concern. 
What comprises the ‘neoliberal component’ of a complex situation? Can this 
component be rightly identified as a defining component of such an overdetermined 
situation? If not, is the mere existence of this component sufficient to warrant using 
the term ‘neoliberal’ to characterise that situation’s specificity?  Secondly, I’ve argued 
that more thought needs to be devoted to what it means to identify ‘similarities’ from 
case to case (where the ‘cases’ vary in scale), since formal (epistemic) and substantive 
(ontological) similarities are quite different things. In both cases I’ve suggested that 
critical realism – no longer de rigeur among researchers in human and environmental 
geography – still offers some useful intellectual resources. The environmental 
geographers whose work I’ve been reading should have the courage – if the evidence 
suggests as much – to do what Larner and Peck seem to fear. If, in terms of causal 
processes and outcomes, neoliberal policies turn out to have highly specific, even 
unique, environmental impacts from situation to situation then this idiographic finding 
should not be glossed in the desire to identity ‘general’ patterns that can then be used 
to condemn a non-existent ‘neoliberalism in general’. Following Cox and Mair (1989), 
the ‘meso-level’ concepts that may in time eventuate from environmental research 
into various neoliberalisations may be highly context-specific rather than 
generalisable (albeit within a restricted family of cases).   
 This said, I’m all too aware that the road to nowhere I mentioned earlier will 
remain appealing for all those geographical critics with research interests in 
neoliberalism. The habit of naming and evaluating the unnameable – the grand 
phenomena that’s supposedly expressed through diverse spatio-temporal particulars – 
dies hard. This is why I suspect ‘neoliberalism’ will remain a necessary illusion for 
those on the geographical left: something we know doesn’t exist as such, but the idea 
of whose existence allows our ‘local’ research finding to connect to a much bigger 





Barnett C (2005) The consolation of ‘neoliberalism’ Geoforum 36, 1: 7-12 
Gibson-Graham J-K (1996) The end of capitalism (as we know it) Oxford: Blackwell 
Harvey, D. (1985) The urbanisation of capital Oxford: Blackwell 
Larner W (2003) Neoliberalism? Environment and Plannning D 21, 4: 509-12 
McCarthy J and Prudham S (2004) Neoliberal nature and the nature of neoliberalism 
Geoforum 35 3 275-84 
Peck J (1996) Workplace New York: Guilford 
Peck J (2001) Neoliberalizing states Progress in Human Geography 25, 3: 445-55 
Peck J (2004) Geography and public policy: constructions of neoliberalism Progress 
in Human Geography 28, 3: 392-405 
Peck J and Tickell A (2002) Neoliberalizing space Antipode 34, 3: 380-404 
Perreault T and Martin P (2005) Geographies of neoliberalism in Latin America 
Environment and Planning A 37, 2: 191-202 
